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Income-tax Department
Edited

by

Stephen G. Rusk

During the years when excess-profits and war-profits taxes were imposed,
based on invested capital, many harassed taxpayers sought the relief that
seemed available to them through the provisions of section 210 of the act of
1917 and sections 327 and 328 of the subsequent revenue acts, only to find that
an illiberal interpretation of the language of these sections estopped them from
success. It will be remembered that these sections of the law, liberally inter
preted, sought to bring into reasonable proportion the rate of excess-profits tax
of corporations engaged in a like or similar business, so that any whose tax was
greatly in excess of the average might have his levy reduced to the average rate.
Therefore, when a taxpayer discovered that the excess-profits tax imposed
upon him was greatly in excess of that upon like businesses, it occurred to him,
quite naturally, that he should be given relief. He was reminded annually of
these provisions by the requirement that he state in his return the names of
three or more taxpayers engaged in a like or similar business.
It is obvious that the commissioner must have found these provisions em
barrassing at first because of a lack of statistics of the invested capital and net
income of groups engaged in like or similar business, and because of the diffi
culty of interpreting the phrase “like or similar business.” The duty at once
devolved upon him to interpret the language of the provisions carefully and
to grant relief only after the most careful consideration. If he had not carefully
and perhaps parsimoniously conceded that abnormality existed in cases brought
to him for decision, the door would have been pushed wide open and a large
group of taxpayers would have obtained relief that was not intended for them.
As a result of the commissioner’s attitude, it has become generally known
that to obtain relief under these sections one must be amply armed with facts
and comparisons; that it is not well to assume simply because one’s excess
profits tax was about 60 per cent. of the net income and because salaries had
been comparatively small, that the commissioner will throw up his hands and
recompute one’s tax. It seemed that every contingency mentioned in the
section had to be present and the facts quite beyond controversy, to avoid a
denial.
The dissenting opinion of Messrs. Trammell and Phillips on a decision of the
United States board of tax appeals, in the case of High Shoals Company
(docket No. 1686), upon the question of granting relief under sections 327 and
328, illustrates the difficulties of at least one taxpayer in obtaining relief.
This taxpayer’s appeal, which was denied by the board, was based on the claim
that because of abnormalities of capital and income in the year 1918 it paid
excess-profits taxes higher than the average paid by those engaged in a like or
similar business. Its business was the manufacture of cotton cloth. Its
original mill was constructed at a cost somewhat lower than the cost of con
struction of similar buildings in its vicinity. Additions were made in 1902 and
1903 at about 50 per cent. of the then prevailing costs of similar construction.
It developed water power on its property at a cost of $50,000 which had a
value of $350,000. Its excess-profits taxes in 1918 were 59.31 per cent. of its
net income, and the net income was 40.84 per cent. of its invested capital.
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Similar abnormalities in the percentage of excess profits to net income were
present in 1919.
This taxpayer’s appeal was denied. The reason for denial is stated as
follows:
The evidence does not warrant a finding that there was such an ab
normality of income or capital of the taxpayer for the calendar year 1918
and for the two-month period ended February 29, 1920, as entitles it to
a determination of tax liability under section 328 of the revenue act of 1918.

From a reading of the dissenting opinion of Messrs. Trammell and Phillips,
it appears that the taxpayer presented no evidence (a) of the value of the
buildings at December 31, 1917; (b) as to the $350,000 value of the water
power it developed at a cost of $50,000; (c) that its tax was disproportionate as
compared to those engaged in like or similar business. It appears, however,
that evidence was adduced that the costs of the buildings were included in
invested capital at a much lower value than the prevailing prices when they
were constructed; that because of the low cost of its water power the cost of
hydro-electric power to this taxpayer was much less than the cost of this
power to others, thus supporting the taxpayer’s estimate that its water had a
reasonable value of $350,000.
How the taxpayer could prove that his tax was disproportionate to that paid
by others in a like or similar business is, of course, not the affair of the board,
but, as the dissenting opinion points out, since there seemed sufficient evidence
adduced to indicate an abnormality of income and capital that would work a
hardship upon the taxpayer, the board would only be following its own prece
dent if it “had referred the case back to the commissioner for the selection of
comparatives and the determination of the tax based upon the use thereof”.
Here is a case that seems to fall well within the provisions of sections 327
and 328 of the act of 1918, and where the taxpayer was entitled to relief if the
comparatives indicated its tax to be disproportionate; yet without an endeavor
to learn what the comparatives would show this taxpayer was denied his
reasonable contentions.
“Insufficient evidence” is a reef upon which many a sturdy tax ship has been
wrecked. Evidence is a term that can not be adequately defined, but even
those eminent in the legal profession say: A lawsuit is not won until the ultimate
court decision is had—regardless, apparently, of the clarity of the question at
issue, the apparent adequacy of the evidence and the skill with which the
case is presented.
SUMMARY OF RECENT RULINGS

Where insured members deposited with a society an amount estimated to
cover a year’s losses and expenses, and this deposit and the interest thereon
remained the property of the members, the society’s interest therein, other than
for expenses not arising until a payment of a loss by it, it received no net
income therefrom.
A society insuring jewelers against fire, theft, barratry, embezzlement and
risks of transportation, its charter not including casualty insurance, is not
taxable under the 1916 act as a casualty insurance company.
The act of October 3, 1917, imposing a tax on the issuance of insurance
policies measured by the premiums charged, applies to mutual insurance to
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jewelers, the cost of which depends upon actual losses and expenses, although
the deposit of an estimated amount is made in advance. (United States
district court, S. D. of New York, Jewelers Safety Fund Society v. Edwards,
collector.)
Invested capital under the 1918 act may include actual cash value of notes
made in good faith, paid for stock issued, although the state law provides that
no stock shall be issued therefor but does not render void such stock.
Income and profits taxes are current annual expenses and proper charges
against the earnings of the year in which they become due and payable whether
the books are kept on a cash or accrual basis and may or may not be deducted
from invested capital for the year in which paid when the earnings are sufficient.
(United States district court, S. D. of New York, Kaufman & Co., Inc., v.
Bowers, collector.)
The time within which an appeal may be filed with the board of tax appeals
under section 274 of the act of 1924, does not include the following day when
the 60th day falls on Sunday. (Supreme court of the District of Columbia,
Belmont Smokeless Coal Co. v. United States board of tax appeals.)
A bequest to charity is exempt only where there is a certainty that the.
bequest will take affect. (Circuit court of appeals, second circuit, Kahn, et al.,
executors, v. Bowers.)
In determining whether, on the payment of dividends, there is sufficient
income therefor, there must first be deducted a proportionate amount of the
excess-profits tax for the year according to the fractional part thereof which
has elapsed, and if the excess is not sufficient to meet the dividend payments,
the invested capital must be proportionately reduced. (Court of claims of the
United States, Franklin D’Olier et al., v. United States.)
A corporation is doing business and is liable for the capital-stock tax under
the 1916 and 1918 acts, when it is doing principally what it was organized to do,
namely, holding the stock of another corporation to raise money for it, holding
stockholders’ and directors’ meetings, keeping books, maintaining an office, etc.
(Supreme court of the United States, Edwards, collector, v. Chile Copper
Company.)
Taxes for 1917 having been assessed and paid, production of records in
regard to income for that period can not be compelled after three years.
(Circuit court of appeals, third circuit, Farmers & Mechanics National Bank of
Philadelphia v. United States.)
The object of the gift tax was to make effective income and estate-tax provi
sions appertaining to larger estates.
The tax is not upon property nor upon any incidents arising from its owner
ship, but is an excise tax upon the transmission or transfer after the gift is
complete, and is not subject to apportionment.
The retroactive provisions are only an exercise of sound legislative judgment
and are not in violation of the constitution, as taking property without due
process of law and without compensation.
The gift tax does not in any substantial manner impair the exercise of gov
ernmental powers of the states, though the subject of the gift be municipal
securities. The fact that the law creates a lien upon the property does not
change its character from an excise to a direct tax. (District court of the
western district of Michigan, S. D., Blodgett v. Holden, collector.)
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The board of tax appeals may prescribe rules for the admission of persons to
prosecute claims before it, but denial of admissions, suspension and disbarment
may be only after fair investigation, notice, hearing and opportunity to answer.
One denied admission should demand the right to be heard before bringing
mandamus to compel enrollment. (Supreme court of the United States,
Goldsmith v. United States board of tax appeals.)
Acceptance of principal does not preclude suit for interest where there is a
statutory provision for such interest.
Interest on refunds allowed is limited “to the date of such allowance” by
section 1324 of the act of 1921.
The date of an allowance of a refund under section 1324, act of 1921, is the
date of the final approval of refund by the commissioner.
Specific protest, under section 1324, act of 1921, authorizing interest on
refunds from date of payment is a protest setting forth its basis and reasons,
and in its absence, interest is to be dated only from six months after filing claim.
Under section 1909, act of 1917, allowing credit for taxes paid in advance,
where a refund was allowed for the amount actually paid, there may be no
recovery of interest on anything but that which was paid. (Supreme court of
the United States, Girard Trust Co., et al., v. United States.)

TREASURY RULINGS
(T. D. 3790)
Article 1503: Association distinguished from partnership.
Income tax—Revenue act of 1918—Decision of supreme court
1. Associations—Partnerships—Corporations.
As used in the revenue act of 1918 the term “corporation ” includes
associations and joint stock companies and the term “partnership”
refers to ordinary partnerships. Unincorporated joint-stock associa
tions which conduct their business in the general form and mode of
procedure of a corporation are taxable as corporations, although
technically such associations are partnerships under the law of the
state where organized.
2. Same—Constitutionality.
Congress has the constitutional power to tax as a corporation an
unincorporated association which transacts its business as if it were
incorporated, and the power of congress is not affected by the fact
that, under the law of the particular state, the association can not
hold title to property, or that its shareholders are individually liable
for the association’s debts, or that it is not recognized as a legal entity.
3. Case Followed.
The case of Hecht v. Malley (263 U. S., 144 [T. D. 3595, C. B. III-1,
489]) followed.
The following decision of the United States supreme court in the case of
Burk-Waggoner Oil Association v. Hopkins, collector, is published for the infor
mation of internal-revenue officers and others concerned.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Burk-Waggoner Oil Association, plaintiff in error, v. George C. Hopkins,
collector of internal revenue.
[November 16, 1925.]
Mr. Justice Brandeis delivered the opinion of the court.
The Burk-Waggoner Oil Association is an unincorporated joint-stock associ
ation like those described in Hecht v. Malley (265 U. S., 144). It was or
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ganized in Texas and carried on its business there. Under the revenue act
of 1918, act of February 24, 1919 (ch. 18, 40 Stat., 1057), it was assessed as a
corporation the sum of $561,279.20 for income and excess-profits taxes for the
year 1919. It paid the tax under protest in quarterly instalments, and after
appropriate proceedings brought this suit in the federal district court for
northern Texas against the collector of internal revenue to recover one of the
instalments. The association asserted that it was a partnership; contended
that under the act no partnership was taxable as such; and claimed that if
the act be construed as authorizing the taxation of a partnership as a corpora
tion, or the taxation of the group for the distributive share of the individual
members, it violated the federal constitution. The district court entered
judgment for the defendant. (296 Fed., 492.) The case is here under section
238 of the judicial code, on direct writ of error allowed and filed April 21,
1924. Compare Towne v. Eisner (245 U. S. 418, 425; T. D. 2634).
The revenue act of 1918, sections 210, 211, 218 (a), 224, 335 (c), provides
in terms that individuals carrying on business in partnership shall be liable
for income tax only in their individual capacity, and that the members of
partnerships are taxable upon their distributive shares of the partnership in
come, whether distributed or not. It subjects corporations to income and ex
cess-profits taxes different from those imposed upon individuals. See sections
210-213 and sections 230, 300. It provides in section 1: “That when used in
this act . . . The term ‘corporation’ includes associations, joint-stock
companies, and insurance companies.” By the common law of Texas a part
nership is not an entity (Glasscock v. Price, 92 Tex., 271; McManus v. Cash &
Luckel, 101 Tex., 261); an association like the plaintiff is a partnership; its
shareholders are individually liable for its debts as members of a partnership
{Thompson v. Schmitt, 114 Tex.,----------- ; Victor Refining Co. v. City National
Bank of Commerce, 114 Tex.,-------- ); and the association can not hold real
property except through a trustee {Edwards v. Old Settlers' Association (Tex.
Civ. App.), 166 S. W., 423, 426). A Texas statute provides that such associa
tions may sue and be sued in their own name. Act of April 18, 1907 (ch. 128,
Vernon’s Sayles’ Texas Civil Statutes, 1914, title 102, ch. 2, arts. 6149-6154).
Since the writ of error was allowed this court has held, in Hecht v. Malley,
that associations like the plaintiff are, by virtue of section 1, subject to the
special excise tax imposed by the revenue law of 1918 on every “domestic
corporation.”
The Burk-Waggoner Association contends that what is called its property
and income were in law the property and income of its members; that owner
ship, receipt, and segregation are essential elements of income which congress
can not affect; that consequently income can be taxed by congress without
apportionment only to the owner thereof; that the income of an enterprise
when considered in its relation to all others than the owners is not income
within the purview of the sixteenth amendment; and that thus what is called
the income of the association can be taxed only to the partners upon their un
distributed shares of the partnership profits, for otherwise such a distribution
would neither enrich nor segregate anything to the separate use of a partner.
The association further contends that while congress may classify all recip
ients of income upon any reasonable basis for the purpose of imposing income
taxes at different rates, or for other purposes connected with the levying and
collection of such taxes, it can not tax the income of the association, for that
would make out of a business group whose property under the law of the state
is owned by the members individually an entity capable of owning property
and receiving income; that to attempt this would constitute not classification
but an unlawful invasion of the state’s exclusive power to regulate the owner
ship of property within its borders; that, on the other hand, if the tax be con
sidered as one imposed upon the members and collected from the group, it
would likewise be void, both because it is a direct tax not imposed upon in
come and not apportioned among the states and because it is so arbitrary and
variable in its rates and application as to conflict with the due process clause.
The association contends finally that there is a conflict between the specific
provisions of the revenue act of 1918 for the taxation of partnership income to
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the members only and the definition of the term “corporation” in section 1;
and that the grave constitutional doubts which necessarily arise, if the act be
construed as attempting to impose the corporation income tax upon associations
which by the laws of the state are partnerships, present a compelling reason
for construing the act as not subjecting the association’s income to the taxes
imposed upon corporations. Compare United States v. Delaware & Hudson
Co. (213 U. S., 366, 407).
There is no room for applying the rule of construction urged in aid of con
stitutionality. It is clear that congress intended to subject such joint-stock
associations to the income and excess-profits taxes as well as to the capital
stock tax. The definition given to the term “corporation ” in section 1 applies
to the entire act. The language of the section presents no ambiguity. Nor is
there any inconsistency between that section and sections 218 (a) and 335 (c),
which refer specifically to the taxation of partnerships. The term partnership
as used in these sections obviously refers only to ordinary partnerships. Unin
corporated joint-stock associations, although technically partnerships under
the law of many states, are not in common parlance referred to as such. They
have usually a fixed capital stock divided into shares represented by certificates
transferable only upon the books of the company, manage their affairs by a
board of directors and executive officers, and conduct their business in the
general form and mode of procedure of a corporation. Because of this re
semblance in form and effectiveness, these business organizations are subjected
by the act to these taxes as corporation.
The claim that the act, if so construed, violates the constitution is also
unsound. It is true that congress can not make a thing income which is not
so in fact. But the thing to which the tax was here applied is confessedly
income earned in the name of the association. It is true that congress can
not convert into a corporation an organization which by the law of its state
is deemed to be a partnership. But nothing in the constitution precludes
congress from taxing as a corporation an association which, although unin
corporated, transacts its business as if it were incorporated. The power of
congress so to tax associations is not affected by the fact that, under the law
of a particular state, the association can not hold title to property, or that its
shareholders are individually liable for the association’s debts, or that it is not
recognized as a legal entity. Neither the conception of unincorporated asso
ciations prevailing under the local law, nor the relation under that law of the
association to its shareholders, nor their relation to each other and to outsiders,
is of legal significance as bearing upon the power of congress to determine how
and at what rate the income of the joint enterprise shall be taxed.
Affirmed.

(T. D. 3796)
Article 1541: Dividends: (also section 213 (a), article 51.)

Income tax—Revenue act of 1918—Decision of court
Income Tax—Distributions—Advancements—Withdrawals—
Dividends.
Where a corporation has on hand a surplus against which the
stockholders make unauthorized withdrawals during the taxable year
and in a subsequent taxable year the board of directors duly passes a
resolution distributing the surplus and declaring the withdrawals as
dividends, the withdrawals are income to the stockholders for the
year in which received and not for the year in which authorized by
the board. Unauthorized withdrawals by stockholders held not a
loan from the company to stockholders but a distribution within the
meaning of section 201 (a) of the revenue act of 1918.
The following decision of the United States district court for the eastern
district of Tennessee in the case of Chattanooga Savings Bank, administrator
of Key, v. Brewer, collector, is published for the information of internal-revenue
officers and others concerned.
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United States District Court at Chattanooga, Tenn.
Chattanooga Savings Bank, administrator of the estate of John D. Key, deceased,
v. L. P. Brewer, collector of internal revenue.
[August 26, 1925.]
This is an action brought by plaintiff, Chattanooga Savings Bank, as admin
istrator of the estate of John D. Key, deceased, to recover the sum of $13,555.89,
which it alleges was illegally exacted from it by the defendant as collector of
internal revenue.
The Key-James Brick Co., a Tennessee corporation, was organized about the
year 1912. Its history up to 1919 is not material to any issue here. During
the year 1920 its directors were John D. Key, Webster T. James, D. M. Hey,
and A. B. Adams who were dummy or paper directors required by corporation
laws of Tennessee. They took no active management in the corporation. The
record indicates that Hey was never at the plant at all. W. T. James was
about the plant occasionally, but he took no active management in its affairs,
although he was vice-president in the year 1920, and seems to have drawn a
salary. John D. Key was in active charge. He was the president and general
manager and active treasurer of the corporation. A. B. Adams was secretary
and bookkeeper, acting solely under the direction of Key.
The authorized capital of the company was $100,000, of which $69,000 was
outstanding, leaving $31,000 unissued. Mr. Key owned fifty-two sixty-ninths
and Mr. W. T. James seventeen sixty-ninths of this $69,000 outstanding stock.
Qualifying shares had been issued to the paper directors, which were in turn
assigned to Mr. Key and Mr. James.
At the close of business December 31, 1919, the company had a surplus of
$27,198.73. On January 15, 1920, the following entry appears upon the min
utes of the directors’ meeting of that date, to wit: “Thereupon it was moved by
A. B. Adams and seconded by W. T. James that $27,000 of said surplus be
distributed to stockholders in pro rata of their share holdings, and motion
was adopted. Said distribution was thereupon ordered to be made upon the
following basis: John D. Key, fifty-two sixty-ninths of $27,000, $20,347.83;
W. T. James, seventeen sixty-ninths of $27,000, $6,652.17, and the secretary
was directed to credit their respective accounts accordingly.”
As reflected by the auditor’s report, at the close of business December 31,
1919, James was charged with $4,000 and Key with $2,500. This $4,000 for the
most part represented advancements made to James during the year 1919, and
was discharged on January 15, 1920, by deducting it from his dividend of
$6,652.17, and James was given a check for the remainder. The same thing
occurred as to $2,500 charged against Key. At the close of the year 1920
the company had a surplus of net profits to the amount of $100,438.79. Out
of this amount from time to time and at various times during the year 1920
Key had received $53,360.80 and James had received $17,444.72. The amount
each received was practically in proportion to the amount of the capital stock
owned by each. The payment of these amounts in the manner and at the
times indicated was not authorized at any meeting of the board of directors
or at any stockholders’ meeting. As a matter of fact, there was only one meet
ing of either in the year 1920, to wit, the before-mentioned meeting of the board
of directors on January 15, 1920, and a meeting of the stockholders of the
same date.
The manner in which these various amounts were received by Mr. Key and
Mr. James is reflected in the testimony of Mr. Adams, as follows: That he
was secretary of the company in 1920 and had charge of the books and that
personal accounts were carried on the ledger against Key and James. The
debit and credit side of these accounts for 1920 are copied in the testimony
written up by the stenographer at pages 47 and 48. In his capacity as book
keeper Adams submitted statements at frequent intervals to Mr. Key showing
the condition of the company’s finances and cash on hand, and from time to
time Key would tell him he wanted a cheque, and that Mr. James wanted a
cheque as advancements, wanted to borrow some money, and that on Key’s in
structions he (Adams) would draw the cheque; that he had no authority
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otherwise; that he was never consulted by Key as an officer or director of the
company with reference to whether such withdrawals should be made; that he
as bookkeeper knew what money was taken in and was paid, and that no
moneys were paid to Mr. Key or Mr. James without his knowledge; that he
wrote the cheques; that the cheques were signed by Mr. Key in his capacity as
president and treasurer, but that he (Adams) as bookkeeper drew the cheques
and made the entries on the books in the usual run of bookkeeping; that
it was his manner as bookkeeper of keeping memoranda of the transac
tions; that the accounts receivable upon the books were divided into trade
accounts receivable, suspense accounts receivable, and personal accounts
receivable. ...
Mr. Adams further testifies that neither Mr. Key nor Mr. James, Sr., the
other two directors, ever found any fault with the way in which the accounts
were being handled, nor was any question raised about it until the directors’
meeting in January, 1920; that he had not sent statements to either Mr. C. E.
James or Mr. Hey, and that no information with reference to the withdrawals
was sent to them from the office; that in making the entries on the books of the
cheques and withdrawals he was simply acting as bookkeeper, and that he was
not thereby making a record of action by the board of directors, and that in
issuing the cheques to Key and James he simply followed Key’s instructions;
that he never had any conversation with Mr. Key about it; that he did not
regard the surplus or assets of the corporation in any way distributed by these
transactions, because he considered the accounts against Key and James as
solvent; that he regarded these transactions essentially as loans to Key and
James, and he regarded the entries on the books as open accounts and as
evidence of loans from the corporation to Key and James, but that no note or
other evidence of indebtedness was given therefor. . . .
As portrayed by the entries taken from the books on January 15, 1920, Key
was charged with $3,326.08, and on the same date with $14,521.75, making a
total cash received by him on that date of $17,847.83. On the same date
James was charged with $2,652.17. On April 1, 1920, Key was charged with
$15,072.46, and Adams was charged with $4,927.54. On July 7,1920, Mr. Key
was charged with $7,500 and Mr. James with $2,500. On November 9, 1920,
Key was charged with $22,982.82 and James with $7,017.18. These figures do
not indicate all the charges upon the books against either, but I am simply
using them as illustrating the evident fact that both were withdrawing cash
on the same dates and each in proportion to his share holdings.
The insistence of the defendant is that this $53,360.80 received by Key from
the Key-James Brick Co. in varying amounts and at different times in the
year 1920 is taxable income for 1920. The insistence of the plaintiff is that
this fund does not represent income at all for the year 1920, but is taxable as
income for the year 1921. This insistence is based upon the idea that the
receipts of this fund by Key in 1920 was only a loan to him by the company,
for which loan he was charged upon the books of the company, and that it
could not be taxable as income until July 14, 1921, when the following resolu
tion was passed by the board of directors, to wit:
“ It was moved by Mr. W. A. Sadd and seconded by Mr. W. T. James that
the amounts listed in said report as accounts receivable due from W. T. James
in the sum of $17,444.82 and due from the estate of John D. Key, deceased,
in the sum of $53,360.80, be written off as a dividend. Said motion carried.
It was then regularly moved and seconded that the sum of $70,805.52 be with
drawn from the surplus account and distributed to the stockholders in propor
tion to their share holdings and said motion carried. Said distribution was
thereupon ordered to be made as follows: W. T. James, seventeen sixty-ninths,
or $17,444.72; estate of John D. Key, deceased, fifty-two sixty-ninths, or
$53,360.80, and the secretary was instructed to credit their respective accounts
accordingly.”
I conclude from the testimony quoted above, as well as from all the other
facts and circumstances adduced in evidence in the case, and therefore so
find as a fact, that this sum of $53,360.80 was not a loan to Key, and was not
so regarded. In determining this question one must look not alone to book
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entries made by the bookkeeper, or to isolated expressions of witnesses or
parties, but one must endeavor to visualize the entire situation as it existed.
With the exception of a few occasional conferences with James, which seem
to have been of slight importance, Key was as completely and unrestrictedly
in control and management of the company as if it had been his individual
business. While Adams was in law a director, he was in fact the agent and
employee of Key and was directed by him. The cheques for this money were
given to Key at his instance only. If these transactions constitute a loan or
loans, then as a matter of fact the loan was made by Key to himself, which is, of
course, an unthinkable thing, for a borrower necessarily implies a lender.
The charter of the company forbids any loan to a stockholder, and it will
hardly be presumed that Key, who was not only a stockholder but president
and manager, would openly and directly violate this provision of the charter.
Whatever may be said as to the legal ownership of this fund being in the
corporation, yet it remains that in point of fact and of strict right it belonged
to Key. He and James were the sole stockholders. No other person had
any real equitable interest therein. The money was accumulating, it was idle
in the treasury, and James would occasionally ask that certain amounts of
it be advanced to him. I think there appeared to Mr. Key no good reason
why this should not be done and that he therefore at intervals made a division
of it between himself and James, its real owners, in accordance with the shares
of each therein, and I assume that the entries upon the books constituted in
fact nothing more than a memorandum indicating the amounts each had re
ceived rather than any obligation upon the part of either to repay. Neither
ever gave any note or other evidence of indebtedness, nor were they ever
charged nor did they ever pay interest thereon. If the facts justify the con
clusion that this was not a loan to Key, then it follows that it was taxable in
come for 1920.
The term "gross income” is defined by the law to include "Gains, profits,
and income derived from . . . dividends ... or transaction of any
business carried on for gains or profits and income derived from any source
whatever.” The revenue act of 1918 defines dividends as follows:
“Sec. 201. (a) That the term ‘dividend’ when used in this title . . .
means (1) any distribution made by a corporation, ... to its share
holders or members, whether in cash or in other property or in stock of the
corporation, out of its earnings or profits accumulated since February 28,1913.”
“In order to be dividend for the purposes of the income tax, a distribu
tion need not be called a ‘dividend.’ There need be no formal declaration.”
(Holmes’ Federal Taxes, p. 774, S. 407.)
This fund constituted a portion of the earnings or profits of the Key-James
Brick Co. for the year 1920, and was as a matter of fact distributed to its two
shareholders in that year.
I can not concur in the proposition so plausibly advanced by able counsel
that the resolution of the board of directors of July 14, 1921, declaring a
dividend and ordering a distribution ipso facto impressed this fund with the
characteristics of income for 1921. At the date of this resolution directing
that “the sum of $70,805.52 be withdrawn from the surplus account and dis
tributed to the stockholders in proportion to their share holdings,” and the
further direction that distribution be made to James and Key, the corporation
did not have the money to withdraw or distribute. The money had the year
before been withdrawn and distributed by Mr. Key.
Real facts rather than record resolutions give rise to income. Resolutions
of directors after all are no more than evidential. (Doyle v. Mitchell, 247
U. S., 179 [T. D. 2723]; Southern Pac. Rd. Co. v. Muenter, 260 Fed., 837
[T. D. 2944; C. B. 1, 216]; Douglas v. Edwards, 298 Fed., 229.) In other words
the government is not precluded from going behind the corporation’s books and
assessing the tax upon the basis of actual facts. If the distribution of the
money by Mr. Key in 1920 was a distribution at all as distinguished from a
loan, then it by the very terms of the act of 1918, section 201, subsection (a),
was conclusively presumed to be taxable for 1920, and this because it was not
the policy of congress, as pointed out in the cases of Harder v. Irwin (285
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Fed., 402; [T. D. 3420; C. B. II-1, 6]) and Douglas v. Edwards (298 Fed.,
237) to allow taxpayers by means of bookkeeping or otherwise to determine
for themselves to what year such distribution should be allocated.
The plaintiff advances two other propositions:
First, to wit, that the action of Key in withdrawing this money was without
authority, and, second, that its withdrawal depleted or impaired the capital
stock.
I think the second proposition would only be material in case it should clearly
appear that the fund withdrawn was a part of the capital stock, in which
event it would not be taxable as income. But this does not clearly so ap
pear, and as I view the record it is not so insisted, the testing question being
not whether the amount involved is a part of the capital stock or income but
simply whether it as income should be reported and taxed in 1920 or 1921.
I do not think either proposition affects the position of the plaintiff. It is
true that under the by-laws, article 5, section 1, “dividends shall be declared
only from the surplus profits of the company at such times as the board of
directors shall direct, and no dividends shall be declared that will impair the
capital of the company.” If Key violated the law and by-laws in either of
these particulars, it might be a matter of which the corporation itself or a
creditor thereof could be heard to complain in a proper case, but I apprehend
that the plaintiff can not be heard to make this objection in this case. Key
died January 1, 1921. If he had lived and had brought this action he could
not have been heard to say that because in 1920 he distributed this income in
violation of the by-laws that he thereby gained an advantage by reason of
his unlawful act, and certainly his administrator can stand upon no higher
ground. But however the distribution of this fund by Key may be regarded
in the light of the by-laws, yet as applicable to the substantive law of the land
it can hardly be regarded as unlawful. He and Mr. James owned this fund; it
in all equity belonged to them. No other director had any real interest in
it nor did any creditor. I assume that it is the law that “Where the officers
of a corporation distribute the profits among the stockholders, without authori
zation by either the directors or stockholders, the corporation may be bound
by the acquiescence of all the stockholders. And where the rights of third
persons are not thereby impaired, the distribution of the profits of a corpora
tion among its stockholders without any action on the part of the board of
directors, but by the consent or agreement of all the stockholders, is the
equivalent of a dividend. Hence an agreement between all the stockholders
as to the manner in which the profits of the corporation shall be disposed of
may be enforced where the rights of creditors or of third persons dealing with
the corporation are not thereby impaired.” (Corpus Juris, vol. 14, p. 807,
sec. 1227, and cases cited in footnotes. Spencer v. Lowe, 198 Fed., 963; Ather
ton v. Beaman, 264 Fed., 881; Ratcliff v. Clendennin, 232 Fed., 66.)
Entertaining these views, I think the bill should be dismissed, and it will
be so ordered.
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